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ABSTRACT: In this paper, I critically examine the main accounts of goals in argumentative discourse, 
aiming to formulate an account that is suitable for the examination of public political arguments, 
where typically multiple legitimate goals are pursued simultaneously. Such arguments are viewed as 
contributions to what can be dialectically reconstructed as multiple simultaneous discussions, and 
are analysed as strategic manoeuvres that can under certain conditions be reasonable but may, if 
such conditions are violated, become fallacious. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In examining public political arguments, the multiple goals that arguers are out to 
achieve are crucial. Typically, a politician speaking publically pursues several 
institutional goals and addresses several issues. This is sometimes the result of the 
multi-dimensional nature of the responsibility of a politician and other times the 
result of the multi-purposive nature of political institutions or even simply because 
public political discourse is open to individuals and groups that have different 
interests and needs as well different commitments and positions. So, for example, a 
politician from the opposition speaking in a parliamentary debate will be out to 
criticise the government, advocate an alternative plan, policy or action proposed by 
his own party, and promote the interests of his constituents. Taking the several 
goals pursued by a politician into account can shed significant light on the strategic 
discursive choices s/he makes in the course of the argument, but can also pose 
challenges for the assessment of the rationality of the discourse. In this paper, I 
critically examine the main accounts of goals in argumentative discourse, aiming to 
offer a proposal of a framework that is suitable for the analysis and evaluation of 
public political arguments, where typically multiple legitimate goals are pursued 
simultaneously. 
 The study of goals in discourse has been an interesting subject of 
investigation for communication scholars. Starting from the assumption that 
“communicative action is strategic and goal-oriented" (Tracy, 1991, p. 1), 
communication scholars have been busy examining the interplay between the goals 
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speakers have and the discourse choices they make (Clark & Delia, 1979; Craig, 
1990; Jacobs et al., 1991; Tracy, 1984; Tracy & Coupland, 1990). In probably one of 
the most influential works, Clark and Delia, driven by their interest in the study of 
communicative strategies, identified three main types of goals: instrumental, 
interpersonal and identity (1979, pp. 199-200). They suggested that participants in 
every communicative situation have goals that belong to three domains: a 
communicator can have goals that are related to the specific obstacle or problem 
defining the task of the communicative situation, i.e. instrumental or task goals, as 
well as goals involving the establishment of maintenance of a relationship with the 
other, i.e. interpersonal goals, and goals related to the self-image conveyed to the 
other, i.e. identity goals. Dependent on the situation, the different types of goals can 
have variant weights and the communicator’s discursive choices are best 
understood as an attempt to pursue them (ibid). The assumption that 
communicative behaviour is driven by multiple goals and that the discursive choices 
can be explained by appeal to these goals underlies much of the research in 
communication. 
The study of goals in argumentative discourse was informed by the research 
investigating the interplay between communicators’ goals and the discourse choice 
they make. Argumentation scholars have not been concerned only with identifying 
the goal(s) that participants in an argumentative exchange have, but also with the 
nature and status of these goals. Different approaches to argumentation have 
formulated different accounts. The questions about the goals and purposes of 
argumentation generated diverse responses. The disagreement between scholars 
was not limited to the question of what the goal of argumentation exactly is, but also 
to whether there can be only one goal or several and even if there is a goal at all. In 
this paper, I review and compare the main accounts offered by argumentation 
scholars on the goals of argumentation (sections 2 and 3), and use the findings in 
formulating my own proposal of a framework that is suitable for the analysis of 
public political arguments, where multiple goals are typically pursued (section 4).  
 
2. PLURALISTIC ACCOUNTS OF GOALS IN ARGUMENTATIVE DISCOURSE 
 
The most important pluralistic account of goals in argumentation, offered by 
modern argumentation scholars, is probably the account offered in Walton’s 
dialogue types (Walton, 1992; Walton & Krabbe, 1995). Walton developed the 
concept of dialogue types, in order to incorporate the contextual characteristics of 
ordinary arguments into the evaluation of real-life argumentation. Walton’s dialogue 
is defined as “an exchange of speech acts between two speech partners in turn-
taking sequence aimed at a collective goal” (1992, p. 133). The goal of the 
argumentative interaction in a certain context defines the dialogue type and 
distinguishes it from other dialogue types.  
Walton and Krabbe distinguish between six main dialogue types, each 
defined in terms of the goal of the argumentative interaction (1995, pp. 65-67). In 
the first type, the persuasion dialogue, the goal is to resolve conflicts of opinion by 
verbal means; in the second type, the negotiation dialogue, the goal is to make a deal 
between parties who have a conflict of interests and a need for cooperation; in the 
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third type, the inquiry dialogue, the goal is to increase knowledge and agreement 
among parties; in the fourth type, the deliberation dialogue, the goal is to reach a 
decision concerning a certain course of action; in the fifth type, the information-
seeking dialogue, the goal is to spread knowledge and reveal positions and finally, in 
the sixth type, the eristic dialogue, the goal is to reach a provisional accommodation 
in a relationship (ibid). Walton and Krabbe present the six main dialogue types as 
the major contexts in which argumentation occurs, acknowledging, however, that 
real-life argumentation also occurs in contexts in which two or more of the main 
dialogue types are mixed. An example of a mixed dialogue type that they discuss is 
political debate, where five dialogue types mix: political debate is partly 
information-seeking, partly deliberation, partly eristic, partly negotiation, and partly 
persuasion (ibid). 
In discussing the different goals that characterise the different contexts of 
argumentation, Walton and Krabbe emphasise the important difference between the 
collective goals that define dialogue types and the individual goals that participants 
pursue in the dialogues. As they explain it: 
 
We must distinguish between the primary or main goal of a type of dialogue and the 
aims of participants in a dialogue of that type. Thus the primary goal of negotiation 
could be characterised as “making a deal”. By entering into negotiation the parties 
implicitly subscribe to this overall purpose. But besides, each party pursues, within 
the dialogue, the particular aim of getting the best out of it for oneself. It wouldn’t be 
negotiations if they didn’t (1995, p. 67).  
 
The distinction between the main goal of an argumentative encounter in a certain 
context and the individual aims of the participants in that encounter is important to 
keep in mind. Walton and Krabbe argue that while both are goals that speakers have 
when they argue, only the former is relevant for the assessment of rationality.  
Michael Gilbert offers another important pluralistic account of goals in 
argumentation. Gilbert’s account comes in the context of his interest in what he 
refers to as ‘expanding the range of argumentation theory to include the sorts of 
arguments people actually enter into’, and for which it is necessary to study what he 
has termed as “coalescent argumentation” (1996, 1997). Gilbert is interested in 
studying arguments that occur in complex social activities and by means of which 
arguers attempt to overcome disagreement and satisfy complex needs, i.e. 
coalescent arguments. For Gilbert, the disagreement that gives rise to arguments is 
not to be understood in terms of claims, statements or propositions, but rather in 
terms of positions, which for him are ‘matrixes of beliefs, attitudes, emotions, 
insights, and values connected to a claim’ (1997, p. 105). Consequently, Gilbert 
emphasises that, in a coalescent argument, arguers are not necessarily only aimed at 
getting their claims accepted. Getting one’s claim accepted, which is taken by many 
to be the (rhetorical) goal of argumentation, is according to him just one of the goals 
arguers might have.  
In identifying the goals arguers have as they engage in a coalescent 
argument, Gilbert distinguishes between goals that are ‘broad and deep-seated 
determinants of behaviour’, which he refers to as motives, and goals which are 
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situation-specific (1997, p. 68).1 Situation-specific goals can be either task goals, 
which are goals that form the immediate strategic object of the encounter, or face 
goals, which are goals that concern the relationship between the participants, 
including their need to maintain or terminate the interaction. According to Gilbert, 
arguers engaged in an argumentative interaction will pursue goals that belong to 
each of the three categories of goals. While acknowledging that, in general, task 
goals are the primary strategic goals in the pursuit of which one engages in 
argumentation to start with, Gilbert emphasises that sometimes arguers’ other goals 
can become more important than the primary goal (2007, p. 151).  
The multiple goals that Gilbert identifies are individual participant’s goals 
rather than goals of the argumentative encounter. However, unlike Walton and 
Krabbe’s individual goals, they are not irrelevant to the assessment of rationality. 
Gilbert identifies the goal of coalescent argumentation as bringing about “an 
agreement between two arguers based on the conjoining of their positions in as 
many ways as possible” (1997, p. 70). He explains that in order to bring an 
argument to a mutually agreeable end with both parties content with the outcome, 
i.e. in order to reach “a coalescent situation incorporating as much as possible of the 
divergent views”, the number of arguers’ goals satisfied must be maximised (1996, 
p. 224). So, in other words, for Gilbert, a good argument is an argument that 
contributes to bringing about an agreement based on maximally fulfilling the 
arguer’s goals and needs as well as the goals and needs of the other arguers 
involved. Also, unlike Walton’s dialogue types, which are defined in terms of the 
different external functions that argumentation fulfils in the particular context that 
the dialogue type models. Gilbert’s coalescent argumentation is defined by one 
internal goal that governs the exchange of arguments in a particular setting, namely 
the interpersonal argumentation among familiars. 
 
3. MONO-FUNCTIONAL ACCOUNTS OF GOALS IN ARGUMENTATION 
 
Ralph Johnson (2000) offers one of the main mono-functional accounts of goals in 
argumentation. In his book, Manifest Rationality, he develops his own view of what 
argumentation is. Aware of the importance of seeing arguments as products and 
processes as well as practices, he sets himself to the task of developing a theory of 
argument that includes all of the three dimensions (2000, p. xi). In this endeavour, 
developing a “healthy concept of argument” is the necessary first step, he asserts.  
Although he acknowledges that “Argumentation clearly serves to help us 
achieve many different goals, among them persuasion, justification, inquiry, belief 
maintenance, decision making, and so forth” (2000, p. 12), Johnson emphasises that 
“the practice of argumentation is best understood as an exercise in manifest 
rationality” (p. 1). That is to say that being an exercise in what he calls manifest 
rationality is what is distinctive of argumentation (p. 144). As he explains,  
 
                                                 
1 Gilbert borrows the concept of motives as a concept that refers to “broad and deep-seated 
determinants of behaviour” from Dillard (1990, p. 72). 
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What is distinctive of argumentation is that it is an exercise in manifest rationality, 
by which I mean not only that a good argument is itself a rational product, a product 
of reasons, reasoning, and reasoners but that it is part of the nature of the enterprise 
that this product must appear to be rational as well (ibid).  
 
Manifest rationality, the distinctive goal of argumentation, is the basis for rational 
persuasion, which Johnson takes to be the goal of argumentative discourse, and a 
goal of arguers. As he puts it,  
 
from the pragmatic point of view, then, an argument is discourse directed toward 
rational persuasion. By rational persuasion, I mean that the arguer wishes to 
persuade the other to accept the conclusion on the basis of the reasons and 
considerations cited, and those alone (p. 160).  
 
The rational persuasion is based on the manifest of rationality but not limited to it. 
For Johnson, the manifest of rationality is the illative tier of argumentation and 
rational persuasion is its dialectical tier.  
Johnson sees rational persuasion as “preeminent” among the other functions 
of argumentation. He explains that rational persuasion is preeminent in the sense 
that argumentation serves the purpose of rational persuasion, “in the first instance”, 
and only then can it serve other purposes such as inquiry for example. As he 
explains it, “There are other purposes or functions that argument serves, such as to 
inquire into some matter or to solidify a point of view. For example, the use of 
argumentation for inquiry, which Johnson describes as self-persuasion, is 
dependent on argument as persuasion, he claims. According to him, “we first learn 
the practice of persuading others then we can use that practice to inquire; that is, to 
persuade ourselves” (p. 149). As it will be shown later in section 4, Johnson 
distinction between rational persuasion and other (external) functions of 
argumentation is very important.2 
Another important mono-functional account of goals in argumentation is the 
account offered within the pragma-dialectical framework. In reviewing this account, 
it is important to capture the development from the standard version of the theory, 
developed by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, 2004), to the extended version, 
developed by van Eemeren and Houtlosser (1999, 2003) and later elaborated in van 
Eemeren (2010). In the literature of the standard pragma-dialectics, four 
interrelated goals of argumentation can be found.  
First, in the characterisation van Eemeren and Grootendorst offer of the 
speech act complex of argumentation, argumentation is defined as an attempt to 
justify an opinion (1984, Ch. 2). Second, also in the characterisation of the speech 
act, the goal of convincing an opponent of the acceptability of an opinion is 
mentioned. According to van Eemeren and Grootendorst, the essential condition for 
the illocutionary act complex argumentation states that “advancing the constellation 
                                                 
2 In granting rational persuasion a preeminent status among other (external) functions of 
argumentation, Johnson follows Hamblin, who writes: “One of the purposes of argument, whether we 
like it or not, is to convince, and our criteria would be less than adequate if they had nothing to say 
about how well an argument may meet this purpose (1970, p. 241). 
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of statements S1, S2 (,…, Sn) counts as an attempt by S to justify O to L’s satisfaction, 
i.e. to convince L of the acceptability of O” (1984, p. 43, my emphasis). The two goals 
of justifying the expressed opinion and of convincing the opponent of its 
acceptability appear also, and similarly in a strongly linked manner, in the general 
definition that van Eemeren and Grootendorst offer for argumentation,3 in their A 
Systematic Theory of Argumentation,  
 
Argumentation is a verbal, social, and rational activity aimed at convincing a 
reasonable critic of the acceptability of a standpoint by putting forward a 
constellation of propositions justifying or refuting the proposition expressed in the 
standpoint (2004, p. 1).  
 
The third and fourth goals that are often associated with the pragma-dialectical 
approach are also closely related. In fact, the goals of critical testing of points of view 
and of (critically) resolving the difference of opinion are generally taken to be the 
goals that van Eemeren and Grootendorst attribute to argumentation. Indeed, the 
two goals appear often enough in the pragma-dialectical literature to justify this 
understanding. For example, in Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions, van 
Eemeren and Grootendorst clearly state that they follow Wenzel (1979) in 
advocating a dialectical approach in which debates must be conducted for the 
critical testing of expressed opinions (p. 93), and that they consequently “regard 
argumentation as part of a critical discussion about an expressed opinion” (1984, p. 
17). Also, later, in the same book, they assert that in their approach, they “assume 
that the argumentation is part of a discussion serving the interactional purpose of 
obtaining a resolution of a dispute (…) concerning an expressed opinion (…)” (p. 
66). It is important to note that, as van Eemeren and Grootendorst clearly state, the 
goal of critically resolving a difference of opinion4 is attributed to argumentation 
when argumentation is viewed as part of a critical discussion, which is what they 
recommend analysts of argumentation should do. In other words, it is the ideal 
model of a critical discussion, which can be seen as the ideal of an argumentative 
exchange, rather than argumentation itself, that is aimed at the critical resolution of 
a difference of opinion (2004, Ch. 3). 
                                                 
3 Van Eemeren and Grootendorst view justifying and convincing as the two aspects of the complex 
speech act of argumentation (1984, p. 51). They explain that arguing and convincing are two 
conventionally linked but distinct speech acts. The two speech acts have different happiness 
conditions: while the (illocutionary) speech act of arguing is correct and happy if the listener 
understands that the speaker advanced pro-argumentation, i.e. is justifying an opinion, for the 
(perlocutionary) speech act of convincing to be happy , the listener needs to accept the claim that is 
being justified, i.e. being convinced (1984, pp. 49-50). 
4 In this paper, I am assuming that the resolution of the difference of opinion, being the goal of a 
critical discussion, needs to be understood as a critical resolution of the difference of opinion, i.e. a 
resolution that is reached by means of critical testing, rather than a consensual resolution of the 
difference of opinion as it is often taken by critics of the pragma-dialectical approach. As van 
Eemeren and Houtlosser clearly put it, “in this model (of a critical discussion) argumentative 
discourse is conceived as aimed at resolving a difference of opinion by putting the acceptability of the 
‘standpoints’ at issue to the test” (2003, p. 387, my emphasis). 
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As a matter of fact, it is important to keep in mind the difference between 
argumentation as a speech act (complex) and the ideal model of a critical discussion 
in which the speech act of argumentation ideally occurs. While justifying an opinion 
and convincing another person are the individual goals of an arguer who performs 
the speech act, the goal of critically testing an opinion or critically resolving a 
difference of opinion are collective goals that are attributed to the arguers under the 
assumption that they are pursuing an ideal argumentative interaction. Nevertheless, 
all of the goals can be considered as internal goals of argumentation. The goals of 
justifying and convincing are goals that characterise the act of arguing and the goal 
of critical resolution is the goal that represents the intrinsic function of 
argumentation as a type of social communicative interaction.  
In the extended theory, an account for more goals is provided. First, by 
means of the concept of strategic manoeuvring (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 1999, 
2003), arguers are attributed the (rhetorical) goal to persuade.5 Second, by means of 
the concept of argumentative activity types (van Eemeren, 2010; van Eemeren & 
Houtlosser, 2005), institutional goals are attributed to arguers. Similar to Walton 
and Krabbe’s dialogue types, the concept was introduced in the vein of accounting 
for the different contexts in which argumentation occurs when examining 
argumentative exchanges.6 The concept characterises the conventionalised more or 
less institutionalised7 communicative practices in which argumentation plays a 
central role. In view of it, arguers engaged in discussions in contexts that are more 
or less institutionalised are attributed goals that represent the socio-political 
purposes for which argumentation is used. Overall, in its extended version, the 
pragma-dialectical theory speaks of three types of arguers’ goals: dialectical, 
rhetorical and institutional.8  
                                                 
5 The pragma-dialectical rhetorical aim of getting one’s standpoint accepted, which is attributed to 
arguers by the concept of strategic manoeuvring, is not exactly the same at the goal to convince the 
other of a certain standpoint, which van Eemeren and Grootendorst had already included in the 
essential condition of the speech act of argumentation. While both the goal to convince and the 
rhetorical goal are expressed by an acceptance of the standpoint at issue, convincing is by definition 
dialectically reasonable and the goal to persuade is not necessarily. The rhetorical goal is sometimes 
referred to as the goal to persuade (e.g. van Eemeren, 2010, p. 264). But more often, it is referred to, 
in more general terms, as being rhetorically effective. 
6 Argumentative activity types are “cultural artefacts [within argumentative discourse] that can be 
identified on the basis of careful empirical observation of argumentative practice” (van Eemeren & 
Houtlosser, 2005). Unlike Walton’s dialogue types, which combine normative and descriptive 
characteristics, activity types are consistently descriptive. See Lewiński (2010, Ch. 2) for a good 
critique on the normative descriptive issue in Walton’s Dialogue types. 
7 Van Eemeren and Houtlosser use the term institutional in a very broad sense, to cover not only 
formally established organisations but also “socially and culturally established macro-contexts (…) in 
which certain (formally or informally) conventionalized communicative practices have developed” 
(van Eemeren, 2010, p. 129). 
8 According to van Eemeren, the three types of goals need to be taken into account when 
argumentative exchanges are examined. As he puts it, “in analyzing and evaluating argumentative 
discourse we need to take account not only of the dialectical and rhetorical aims intrinsic to strategic 
maneuvering but also of the institutional goals of the communicative activity types in which the 
argumentative discourse takes place” (2010, p. 159). 
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The dialectical aims are specifications of the goal of critical resolution of the 
difference of opinion tailored to the different stages of the resolution process. They 
are collective: they express what the interaction between arguers at a certain stage 
of the discussion should be aimed at. Unlike dialectical goals, the rhetorical goals of 
arguers are individual goals that capture the way each of the parties tries to steer 
the argumentative exchange to his or her own favour at every stage of the 
discussion (see examples of dialectical and rhetorical aims in van Eemeren, 2010, p. 
45). Arguers’ institutional goals are generally collective goals that characterise the 
function of the argumentative interaction as a whole rather than the individual 
institutional ambitions of arguers. The three types of goals can also be considered as 
goals of the practice of argumentation. While dialectical and rhetorical goals are 
intrinsic goals, in the sense that the same goals characterise the practice of 
argumentation in any context, institutional goals represent extrinsic context-specific 
functions of argumentation. 
  As it will become clear in the next section, the distinction between intrinsic 
and extrinsic goals of argumentation is important when examining (especially when 
evaluating) public political arguments. But before I move to the discussion of a 
framework in which public political arguments are examined, I would like to briefly 
mention the work of two more scholars that is relevant to my goal in this paper. 
First, I would like to refer to the work of Lilian Bermejo-Luque (2010, 2011), who 
emphasises, maybe more than anyone else, the need to distinguish between the 
intrinsic and extrinsic values of argumentation. Bermejo-Luque follows Toulmin’s 
idea that there is only one function that is “the primary function of arguments, and 
that the other uses, the other functions which arguments have for us, are in a sense 
secondary, and parasitic of this primary justificatory use” (1958, p. 12). But 
Bermejo-Luque would rather speak of values and goals rather than functions.9 As 
she explains, for her: 
 
The idea will be, roughly, that there are goals that make of certain behaviour 
argumentation, and additional goals that we may pursue by arguing. Fulfilling such 
constitutive goals of argumentation will be arguing well. The intrinsic 
argumentative value of a piece of discourse will be a measure of this achievement, 
whereas the instrumental values that a piece of argumentation may have will be a 
measure of its adequacy as a means to different ends (2010, p. 464). 
 
According to Bermejo-Luque, the constitutive goal of argumentation is justification 
in the sense of “showing a target-claim to be correct”. As she puts it, “aiming at 
justifying is what makes of a certain communicative activity argumentation. And, 
correspondingly, good argumentation will be argumentation that actually achieves 
justification, and justification will be the intrinsic value of argumentation just 
                                                 
9 In fact, Bermejo-Luque makes a very strong claim about defining argumentation in terms of a 
function. In opposition what she called value instrumentalism, she argues that “justification is the 
constitutive value of argumentation just because we are assuming that arguing is trying to justify 
and, consequently, that ‘justifying that p’ is equivalent to ‘arguing well for p’. But precisely because of 
this, this conception of argumentative value is not instrumental: the justification of our claims is not 
something that we might achieve or fail to achieve after arguing well; nor is something that we may 
achieve by other means” (2010, p. 466). 
DIMA MOHAMMED 
9 
because argumentation, constitutively, is an attempt at justifying” (2010, p. 466). 
Despite her emphasis on the differences between her own proposal and the other 
approaches, Bermejo-Luque’s view of justifying as the core of what argumentation is 
comes out very similar to van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s view of justifying an 
expressed opinion as the essential condition for argumentation and even to 
Johnson’s view that manifest rationality is what is distinctive of argumentation. 
Second, I would like to refer to the work of Steven Patterson (2010, 2011), 
who is also concerned with the question of what is distinctive of argumentation. 
However, unlike Bermejo-Luque, Patterson is not interested in what constitutes the 
practice but rather in the function that distinguishes it from other communicative 
practices. Patterson distinguishes between the telos of argumentation, which is the 
function that argumentation serves better than alternative modes of linguistic social 
interaction, and what he refers to as “the different effects argumentation can 
have”.10 He argues that underlying the different functions that scholars consider as 
functions of argumentation, there is the telos of what he calls rational doxastic 
coordination. According to him, while doxastic coordination, which is “the bringing 
into equilibrium or harmony of the opinions or beliefs of multiple persons, without 
respect to the means employed”, can be reached by argumentation as well as other 
types of practices (2011, p. 15), rational doxastic coordination cannot be reached 
but through argumentation (2011, p. 18). It is interesting that Patterson does not 
present rational doxastic coordination as an alternative to the different social 
functions proposed by argumentation scholars, but rather as a unifying function. He 
says:  
 
“The idea of rational doxastic coordination is a unifying idea. It is aimed at showing 
how apparently disparate functions of argument are really all members of the same 
family by showing what it is that they all have in common; the common destination 
towards which they all lead by varying degrees” (2011, p. 19).  
 
In the next section, I will draw from the different proposals discussed 
above,11 aiming at formulating a framework that is good for examining public 
political arguments.  
 
 
                                                 
10 Patterson’s proposal can be seen as a response to Jean Goodwin (2007) who criticizes what she 
refers to as function-claims made by so many argumentation scholars. According to Goodwin, there is 
no one single function for argumentation. Argumentation is used for different purposes in different 
contexts. Therefore, one cannot derive norms from functions. It is important to mention, here, that 
Goodwin uses functions in the sense of (extrinsic) purposes for which argumentation is used. These 
are basically the goals that arguers have when they engage in argumentation, both as individuals and 
collectively, and they are different from the (constitutive) goal that defines the act of arguing in all 
the instances it is used regardless of the intentions of arguers.  
11 The review above does by no means cover all the work that has been done by modern 
argumentation scholars on goals in argumentation. Of the relevant contributions that could not be 
covered, mainly for consideration of space, the works of Christopher Tindale (1999) and of Robert 
Pinto (2010) are particularly worth mentioning. 
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4. A FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF PUBLIC POLITICAL 
ARGUMENTS 
 
From the review in the previous sections, it becomes clear that when speaking about 
goals in argumentation, scholars speak of goals of different natures. Before I move to 
the discussion of a framework for goals in public political arguments, I would like to 
highlight four distinctions that are relevant for this task. When speaking of goals in 
argumentation, it is important to distinguish, first, between the goals of arguers and 
the goals of argumentation itself. Even though, in many cases, these two types of 
goals coincide, the distinction is important, especially for the evaluation of 
argumentation. Second, within the goals of argumentation, it is important to 
distinguish between internal goals and external uses. This is also crucial for the 
evaluation of argumentation. A third distinction can be made, within the internal 
goals of argumentation, between constitutive goals of arguments and intrinsic 
functions of it. Despite its importance, I am not sure this distinction is relevant to the 
examination of public political arguments. Fourth, a distinction needs to be made, 
within the goals of arguers, between individual and collective goals. The distinction 
is especially relevant for approaches that see argumentation as an interaction 
between different agents.  
In Table 1, below, the different goals attributed in the different frameworks 
discussed in the previous sections are classified in terms of the four distinctions, I 
have just highlighted: 
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 Goals 
 
 
 
Approaches 
Goals of arguers Goals of argumentation 
Individual 
goals 
Collective 
goals 
Internal 
External 
uses Constitutive 
Goal 
Intrinsic 
function 
Walton & Krabbe’s 
dialogue types 
Arguers’ goals in 
dialogue types 
Goals of 
dialogue 
types 
  
Arguers’ 
individual goals; 
Goals of dialogue 
types 
Gilbert’s  
coalescent 
argumentation 
Face and task 
goals; Motives 
Reach a 
coalescent 
situation 
 
Reach a 
coalescent 
situation 
Reach a coalescent 
situation 
Johnson’s  
manifest  
rationality 
Rational 
persuasion; 
Justification; 
Inquiry; 
Belief-
maintenance; 
Decision-making 
 
Manifest 
rationality; 
Rational 
persuasion 
 
Rational 
persuasion 
Justification; 
Inquiry; 
Belief-
maintenance; 
Decision-making 
vEG’s  
speech act complex  
of argumentation 
 
Justify an opinion; 
Convince of the 
acceptability of the 
opinion 
 
Justify an 
opinion; 
Convince of 
the 
acceptability 
of an opinion 
Consecutive 
perlocutionary 
consequences of 
the speech act of 
arguing 
vEG’s  
critical discussion 
 
Critical 
resolution of 
a difference 
of opinion 
 
Critical 
resolution of 
a difference 
of opinion 
 
vEH’s  
strategic manoeuvring 
Dialectical goals; 
Rhetorical goal 
    
vEH’s  
activity types 
Institutional goals 
Institutional 
goals 
  
Institutional goals 
of activity types 
Bermejo-Luque 
Justify a claim; 
Persuade 
 
Justify a 
claim 
Persuade  
Patterson 
Arguers’ individual 
motivations 
Arguers’ 
collective 
motivations 
 
Rational 
doxastic 
coordination 
 
Table 1: Goals in Argumentation 
 
Here, I would like to emphasise that the distinctions do not create mutually 
exclusive categories of goals. As the table clearly shows, some goals can belong to 
several categories. The distinctions are however important for each category of 
goals has a different role in the examination of argumentation. 
In examining public political arguments, I am guided by considerations 
derived from the characteristics of the practice of argumentation in the political 
domain and the benefits that can be gained from adopting a certain view on goals in 
examining arguments. A first consideration, when deciding which view on the 
internal goal of argumentation to adopt, is related to the discursive interactive 
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nature of the public political arguments. It is important that the internal goal of 
argumentation adopted reflects that. All of the internal gaols presented in the 
frameworks reviewed above do, at least to some extent, consider argument as 
discourse and they all also acknowledge the minimal interaction involved in 
arguing, namely that an argument is addressed at an other and is aimed at a reaction 
from this other. However, only the goals identified by Gilbert’s coalescent 
argumentation and by van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s critical discussion, do 
capture the kind of interaction that is involved in an argumentative exchange, an 
interaction that is shaped by the contributions of all the participants in it. Of the two 
frameworks, the critical discussion seems to be better suited for the examination of 
public political arguments. This is mainly because the model focuses on arguers’ 
commitments rather than on their motives, needs and desires, as Gilbert’s 
coalescent argumentation does. Indeed, Gilbert clearly states that coalescent 
argumentation is a good framework for the examination of interpersonal arguments 
that occur between familiars. In public political arguments, unlike in interpersonal 
arguments, it is important to opt for a view that is in line with the idea of 
accountability in politics. A framework that focuses on arguer’s commitments is 
therefore recommended.  
A second important consideration to take into account is related to the 
nature of goals that are typically pursued in public political arguments. These goals 
are external goals of argumentation that are mostly derived from the more-or-less 
formal institutional contexts in which the arguments occur.12 Taking that into 
account, it is important that the external goals attributed to argumentation 
represent its context-dependent more-or-less-formal institutional uses in politics. In 
view of that, Walton and Krabbe’s dialogue type and van Eemeren and Houtlosser’s 
activity types provide good proposals. Van Eemeren’s view that in an argumentative 
activity type argumentation serves purposes that are “pertinent to the raison d’être 
of the institution” (2010, p. 129) is particularly beneficial. Unlike the goals of 
dialogue types, the institutional goals of activity types do not replace the internal 
goal of an argumentative interaction, but rather complement it, by adding an 
external function or use for the interaction. Nevertheless, the distinction that 
Walton and Krabbe’s make between individual and collective goals of arguers is 
undoubtedly relevant. The individual goals are important in shaping the 
argumentative exchange, and are therefore necessary to take into account when 
analysing argumentative exchanges. However, as it has been argued by Walton and 
Krabbe, it is the collective goals of arguers, or what can also be described as the goal 
of the argumentative interaction, what is important when assessing the rationality 
of argumentation.  
                                                 
12 Here, I am following van Eemeren and Houtlosser and using the term institutional in a very broad 
sense, to cover not only formally established organisations but also “socially and culturally 
established macro-contexts (…) in which certain (formally or informally) conventionalized 
communicative practices have developed” (van Eemeren, 2010, p. 129). Furthermore, I also 
subscribe to Zarefsky’s understanding of political argumentation as institutionalised in the sense of 
having recurrent patterns and characteristics that allow generalisations (2008). 
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However, public political arguments are typically multi-purposive. This is to 
a great extent a result of the multi-dimensional nature of the responsibility of 
politicians as well as the openness of public discourse to individuals and groups that 
have different interests and needs as well as different commitments and positions. 
This is also the case in public debates just as it is in considerably formal institutional 
contexts, such as the British or the European Parliament. Parliamentary debates, for 
example, are not only means for deliberating policies and legislations, but also 
means for holding the executives to account. In an earlier work (Mohammed, 2009, 
Forthcoming a), I have argued that this makes public political arguments a multi-
layered activity type where arguers pursue several legitimate collective goals. Each 
of the layers is defined by one of the collective goals pursued. In this kind of 
practices, and to a great extent as a result of the different purposes, several issues 
get discussed in the same argumentative exchange. Typically, arguers craft their 
contributions to address several issues simultaneously.13 In earlier work, I have also 
proposed that the argumentative exchanges where several issues are addressed be 
reconstructed as several simultaneous discussions (2011, 2013, forthcoming b). The 
discussions, in this proposal, are dialectical analytic constructions. Two discussions 
are simultaneous if there is at least one argument, or one argumentative move, that 
plays a role in both discussions without any of the discussions being subordinate to 
the other. Such a reconstruction of the exchange is beneficial for it allows for 
capturing the strategic design of argumentative moves that are crafted to address 
several issues at a time. 
The important question that follows from this proposal is obviously about 
the evaluation of the reasonableness of argumentative moves that are performed as 
part of such multi-purposive exchanges. As Johnson has nicely put it, a good 
argument is “one that fulfills its purpose” (2000, p. 181). The question here becomes 
which purpose do we take: the internal goal of argumentation or the external use of 
it? Let alone the question about which of the external uses of argumentation to take. 
On the one hand, I believe that, in order for the examination of argumentation to 
benefit the practice of public political arguments, it is important that both purposes 
are taken into account. On the other hand, I also think that it is necessary to keep the 
norms that are derived from the internal goal of argumentation separate from those 
derived from its external political uses. In other words, it is important that the 
assessment of argumentative rationality remain distinguishable from the 
assessment of political rationality. Van Eemeren and Houtlosser suggest that for 
evaluating argumentation in a particular context the analyst needs to apply general 
argumentative norms that are specified by contextual criteria. That means that for 
them, the primary norms remain argumentative. I agree with van Eemeren and 
Houtlosser that political considerations should not modify but just specify 
argumentative norms. It is however necessary to make sure that the two norms are 
not in conflict.  
Public political arguments should be examined from a perspective in which 
the internal goals of argumentation are in principle instrumental for the 
                                                 
13 For examples of how arguers strategically craft their contributions to address several issues 
simultaneously, see Mohammed (forthcoming a, forthcoming b). 
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achievement of the political uses of argumentation. For that the reconstruction of 
the argumentative exchanges in a public political argument is important. For 
example, assuming that the internal goal of argumentation is to critically test points 
of view, and that the public political argument analysed is aimed at holding the 
executive to account, the standpoints attributed to arguers need to express an 
evaluation of the performance of the executive. From such a perspective, the 
assessment of argumentative rationality is also indicative of the political rationality: 
an argumentative move that contributes to the critical testing of a standpoint 
concerning the performance of the executive will also contribute to the holding of 
the executive to account. This reconstruction makes sure that an evaluation in terms 
of the argumentative norms will also be meaningful in political terms. The analyst 
needs to take this consideration into account in reconstructing the different layers 
that constitute a multi-purposive argumentative activity. In every layer, it is 
important to adopt a perspective from which the goal of critical testing is 
instrumental for the achievement of the institutional goal. As a result, the judgment 
of rationality of an argumentative move will be dependent on the function it is 
assumed to fulfil. A move that contributes to the discussion of several issues 
simultaneously or serves several political uses at the same time will be assessed 
differently dependent on the use and the issue. This multiple assessment is 
unavoidable given how multi-faceted public political arguments are. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper, I have reviewed and compared major accounts of goals in 
argumentative discourse, aiming to formulate an account that is suitable for the 
analysis and evaluation of public political arguments, where typically multiple 
legitimate goals are pursued simultaneously. On the basis of the review, I have 
identified four distinctions that need to be taken into account when thinking of goals 
in argumentation. First, it is important to distinguish between the goals of arguers 
and the goals of argumentation itself. Second, within the goals of argumentation, it is 
important to distinguish between internal goals and external uses. Third, within the 
internal goals of argumentation, a distinction can be made between constitutive 
goals of arguments and intrinsic functions of it. Finally, within the goals of arguers, a 
distinction needs to be made between individual and collective goals. The goals in 
each of the categories distinguished play different roles in the examination of 
argumentation.  
In formulating a proposal for a framework for examining public political 
arguments, I was guided by considerations derived from the characteristics of the 
practice of argumentation in the political domain and the benefits that can be gained 
by adopting a certain view on goals in examining arguments. I argued that the 
framework needs to capture the discursive interactive nature of the public political 
arguments and consider arguer’s commitments rather than their beliefs, desire or 
motives. I proposed to consider justification as the internal goal of argumentation 
and critical testing as the internal goal of an argumentative interaction. The 
multitude of institutional goals pursued in public political arguments, which are 
external collective goals, need to be considered as goals that complement, rather 
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than replace, the internal goals of argumentation. In order to do justice to the multi-
purposive nature of public political arguments, I have suggested viewing public 
political arguments as multi-layered activity types, where each layer is defined by 
one of the collective goals pursued. I have also proposed that the argumentative 
exchanges in this activity type be reconstructed as several simultaneous discussions. 
This would allow the analyst to highlight the strategic choices involved in crafting 
argumentative moves that address several issue at the same time. Finally, I 
proposed that public political arguments be examined from a perspective in which 
the internal goals of argumentation are in principle instrumental for the 
achievement of the political uses of argumentation. This, I believe is necessary for an 
argumentative evaluation of argumentation to benefit the practice of political 
arguments. I argued that it is important to take both internal purpose and external 
uses of arguments into account in the evaluation, but that it is equally important to 
keep the norms that are derived from the internal goal of argumentation separate 
from those derived from its external political uses. In order to achieve that, the 
reconstruction of the argumentative exchanges must highlight the instrumentality 
of the goal of critical testing to the achievement of institutional goals. The proposal 
will yield assessments that are meaningful, both argumentatively and politically, but 
which are dependent on the external political goal considered. Consequently, in 
multi-purposive practices such as public political arguments, this means that 
multiple assessments are reached.  
The framework proposed, is by no means final. The proposal is rough and 
preliminary. It certainly requires elaboration and refinement, but I hope it offers a 
good starting point. 
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